

# Chaos In The Littorals: Anarchic War And The United States Marine Corps

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Title: Chaos In The Littorals: Anarchic Wars and the United States Marine Corps

**Author:** Major Francis L. Donovan, United States Marine Corps

**Thesis:** The United States Marine Corps is not preparing for the full spectrum of armed conflict in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In particular, the Marine Corps' concept of future expeditionary operations, Operational Maneuver From The Sea (*OMFTS*), fails to adequately address the threat of armed conflict in the seam between large-scale conventional combat operations and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Yet, as the nation's premier forward-deployed expeditionary force, the Marine Corps will likely become involved in one of the many ongoing and increasingly lethal unconventional and irregular "small wars" fought by insurgents, bandits, warlords, mercenaries, and criminals in and around the world's rapidly expanding coastal cities.

**Discussion:** The *OMFTS* concept requires the Marine Corps to maintain the ability to project power ashore against all forces of resistance, ranging from overcoming devastated infrastructure to assisting friendly people in need of disaster relief to countering the entire spectrum of armed threats. To meet this challenge in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the Marine Corps, as part of a Naval Expeditionary Force, must be prepared to operate in the complex and chaotic environment where the land and sea meet, the littoral regions of the world.

Through the *OMFTS* concept, future expeditionary Marine Air Ground Tasks Forces (MAGTFs) will seek to leverage advanced technologies to increase operational tempo and tactical lethality through synchronized sea-based precision fires, ship-to-objective maneuver, and "just in time" logistics. Preparing to project decisive power ashore in support of conventional large-scale joint or coalition campaigns and humanitarian assistance operations will remain the cornerstone of Marine Corps training and readiness in the coming decades.

However, today's Marine Corps possibly faces a future dominated not by large-scale conventional campaigns, but unconventional and irregular small wars fought in remote and often inhospitable terrain and climate where the lines of distinction between government officials, military leaders, rebel warlords, and commercial profiteers are blurred. While small wars are neither a 21<sup>st</sup> century phenomenon nor new to the Marine Corps, their emergence as the prevalent form of warfare at the dawn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century and their evolution in the post-Cold War security environment warrants attention and review.

Maoists, secessionists, and separatists seeking to achieve their goals will continue to fight "classic" small wars in the 21<sup>st</sup> century; however, the outbreak of violent small wars in Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Haiti, Colombia, and Sri Lanka signifies the emergence of a darker pattern of internal conflict what will be termed in this paper "anarchic wars." In these anarchic wars, fought in the failed or failing states of the Third World, "insurgents" display little interest in legitimacy or political debate and no remorse or restraint toward the level of violence and atrocities they are willing to commit.

Many may argue that few anarchic wars will threaten the vital national interests of the United States and that the risk of involvement in the post-Somalia era does not justify the price of intervention. While this may be true for the time being, it is a shortsighted view of the future. As a maritime nation and participant in the "globalization" of the world's economy, the United States must remain internationally engaged in order to prosper. Its expeditionary forces, specifically the Marine Corps, will possibly be forced into an anarchic war while projecting power ashore in support of America's international economic, security, and humanitarian interests.

The Marine Corps therefore must develop strategy and tactics for fighting such anarchic wars in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The purpose of this paper is to aid that process by defining and evaluating the characteristics of anarchic wars and the unique challenges and demands they will place on future expeditionary MAGTFs.

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**Recommendations:** In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the Marine Corps must be prepared to respond to a wide range of crises and conflicts in the littorals. While the threat of a Major Regional Contingency (MRC) and humanitarian emergencies will continue to be present in the coming decades, Marine Corps expeditionary forces face a future dominated by unconventional and irregular small wars fought by bandits, criminals, and mercenaries in the economically and politically destitute failing and failed states of the Third World.

- **Achieving a Balance:** The identification of small wars as the prevalent form of warfare in the current strategic security environment in many ways contradicts the view of future war sponsored by *JV2010* and *OMFTS*. Expeditionary small wars have dominated the Marine Corps' past and will likely do so in the future. In preparing for the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the Marine Corps can not focus solely on the large-scale conventional wars it wants to fight while ignoring the small wars, specifically anarchic wars, it may have to fight.

- **Intervention Strategy:** The Marine Corps must develop an effective intervention strategy that reflects the post-Cold War strategic environment. The Marine Corps cannot rely on Cold War counterinsurgency strategy, designed primarily for revolutionary warfare, as its primary means to counter the potential threats of tomorrow's small wars. While this type of strategy may apply to a limited number of "classic" small wars in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, it will prove to be useless in future anarchic wars.

- **Intelligence:** The Marine Corps should seek to gain the intelligence collection capabilities Executive Outcomes exploited in Sierra Leone. Executive Outcomes relied on rural Kamajors tribesman as HUMINT sources, guides, and combat troops. While the Marine Corps does not currently prepare units to train, support, and possibly lead indigenous forces, it has done so in past expeditionary small wars. Even though training indigenous populations is currently the responsibility of the U.S. Special Operation Command (SOCOM), the Marine Corps may look toward obtaining elements of this capability. This could be completed by achieving closer working relationships with the U.S. Army's regional Special Forces commands or by creating an organic capability within expeditionary MAGTFs.

In Sierra Leone, Executive Outcomes employed airborne intelligence collection platforms to identify rebel concentrations, employ supporting arms, and direct the rapid and decisive maneuver of air and ground forces. To achieve a similar capability, a designated number of Marine Corps MV-22 or CH-53E aircraft, which offer exceptional range, speed and loiter time, could be equipped with tactical radios, GPS receivers, infrared/television systems, SIGINT equipment, laser range finder/designators, and possibly a side-firing gun such as the GAU-19. These aircraft would not only act as an intelligence collection platforms but could also assume the role of pathfinders, forward air controllers, command and control aircraft, and possibly air-to-ground fire support systems.

- **Small Wars Manual:** While many aspects of the *Small Wars Manual* remain relevant today, it must be revised to reflect the demands and challenges of small wars in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, specifically those provided by anarchic wars. The Marine Corps' recent experiences in Haiti and Somalia, as well as case study's of current anarchic wars in Sierra Leone, the Congo, Sri Lanka, and Liberia, can provide the foundation for developing an updated *Small Wars Manual*.

**Conclusion:** While anarchic wars do not currently threaten America's economic or security interests, the Marine Corps must prepare now for this challenge. In a future anarchic war, the Marine Corps, as was the case with Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone, will likely be tasked with creating a stable security environment for the introduction of follow-on U.S. military forces or internationally-sponsored relief and reform agencies. Creating this stable security environment may lead to direct armed conflict with corrupt government officials, warlords, drug and gun traffickers, bandits, and criminals who thrive in the chaotic breakdown of law and order of anarchic war.

As the nation's premier forward-deployed expeditionary force, the challenge for the Marine Corps in the coming years will be to create an expeditionary MAGTF capable of projecting decisive power ashore in both large-scale conventional conflicts and anarchic wars. In pursuing expeditionary concepts such as *OMFTS*, the Marine Corps must take into consideration the increasingly unique challenges and demands of fighting anarchic wars.

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## Introduction

The United States Marine Corps is not preparing for the full spectrum of armed conflict in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In particular, the Marine Corps' concept of future expeditionary operations, Operational Maneuver From The Sea (*OMFTS*), fails to adequately address the threat of armed conflict in the seam between large-scale conventional combat operations and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Yet, as the nation's premier forward-deployed expeditionary force, the Marine Corps will likely become involved in one of the many ongoing and increasingly lethal unconventional and irregular "small wars" fought by insurgents, bandits, warlords, mercenaries, and criminals in and around the world's rapidly expanding coastal cities.

The *OMFTS* concept requires the Marine Corps to maintain the ability to project power ashore against all forces of resistance, ranging from overcoming devastated infrastructure to assisting friendly people in need of disaster relief to countering the entire spectrum of armed threats.<sup>1</sup> To meet this challenge in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the Marine Corps, as part of a Naval Expeditionary Force, must be prepared to operate in the complex and chaotic environment where the land and sea meet, the littoral regions of the world.

Through the *OMFTS* concept, future expeditionary Marine Air Ground Tasks Forces (MAGTFs) will seek to leverage advanced technologies to increase operational tempo and tactical lethality through synchronized sea-based precision fires, ship-to-objective maneuver, and "just in time" logistics.<sup>2</sup> Preparing to project decisive power ashore in support of conventional large-scale joint or coalition campaigns and humanitarian assistance operations will remain the cornerstone of Marine Corps training and readiness in the coming decades.

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<sup>1</sup> United States Marine Corps Warfighting Concepts For the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, *Operational Maneuver from the Sea*, (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 4 January 1996), I-5.

<sup>2</sup>*Operational Maneuver from the Sea*, I-5.

However, today's Marine Corps possibly faces a future dominated not by large-scale conventional campaigns, but unconventional and irregular small wars fought in remote and often inhospitable terrain and climate where the lines of distinction between government officials, military leaders, rebel warlords, and commercial profiteers are blurred. While small wars are neither a 21<sup>st</sup> century phenomenon nor new to the Marine Corps, their emergence as the prevalent form of warfare at the dawn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century and their evolution in the post-Cold War security environment warrants attention and review.

Maoists, secessionists, and separatists seeking to achieve their goals will continue to fight "classic" small wars in the 21<sup>st</sup> century; however, the outbreak of violent small wars in Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Haiti, Colombia, and Sri Lanka signifies the emergence of a darker pattern of internal conflict what will be termed in this paper "anarchic wars." In these anarchic wars, fought in the failed or failing states of the Third World, "insurgents" display little interest in legitimacy or political debate and no remorse or restraint toward the level of violence and atrocities they are willing to commit.

Many may argue that few anarchic wars will threaten the vital national interests of the United States and that the risk of involvement in the post-Somalia era does not justify the price of intervention. While this may be true for the time being, it is a shortsighted view of the future. As a maritime nation and participant in the "globalization" of the world's economy, the United States must remain internationally engaged in order to prosper. Its expeditionary forces, specifically the Marine Corps, will possibly be forced into an anarchic war while projecting power ashore in support of America's international economic, security, and humanitarian interests.

The Marine Corps therefore must develop strategy and tactics for fighting such anarchic wars in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The purpose of this paper is to aid that process by defining and evaluating the characteristics of anarchic wars and the unique challenges and demands they will place on future expeditionary MAGTFs.

This evaluation begins in Chapter I with a review of post-Cold War security environment and the identification of the small war as the prevalent form of warfare at the turn of the century.

Chapter II traces the evolution of small wars in the 20<sup>th</sup> century to introduce the origins of anarchic wars. Chapter III defines common characteristics of anarchic wars and highlights a number of factors that possibly will influence their complexity and lethality. A case study of a Sierra Leone's anarchic war in Chapter IV provides details of the complex and increasingly dangerous environment in which intervention forces will have to operate. Chapter V reviews the successful performance of an intervention force, Executive Outcomes, in Sierra Leone's anarchic war as a point of departure for developing military intervention strategy and tactics. Chapter VI reviews the intervention strategy employed by Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone and offers recommendations for other potential intervention strategies for anarchic wars.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank Dr. Norman Cigar and Lieutenant Colonel Robert Trout, faculty at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, for their professional insight, guidance, and patience while mentoring this project. I would also like to thank the staff at the Marine Corps Research Center for their enthusiastic and professional research support, and Mr. Gary bowers from *AirScan* for his advice, time, and recommendations. Finally, I want to thank my wife Kim and Vice Admiral Francis R. Donovan USN (Ret) for their continuous encouragement, support, and guidance throughout this project.

## Chapter I

### The Post-Cold War Strategic Security Environment

*The type of conflict in which this country will generally engage in the first quarter of the 21<sup>st</sup> century will require sustainable military capabilities characterized by stealth, speed, range, unprecedented accuracy, lethality, strategic mobility, superior intelligence, and the overall will and ability to prevail. It is essential to maintain U.S. technological superiority, despite the unavoidable tension between advanced capabilities and the maintenance of current capabilities.*

-1999 United States Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century

*As low-intensity conflict rises to the dominance, much of what has passed for strategy during the last two centuries will be proven useless. The shift from conventional war to low-intensity conflict will cause many of today's weapon systems, including specifically those that are most powerful and most advanced, to be assigned to the scrap-heap.*

-Marin Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*

In order to understand the challenges the Marine Corps expeditionary forces will face in the coming decades, the nature of 21<sup>st</sup> century war and the post-Cold War strategic security environment should be analyzed. Research revealed two opposing views of future war summarized in the above quotes and in Figure 1. The first, represented by *Joint Vision 2010* (*JV2010*), claims future war will be the realm of high-tech conventional conflicts in which the United States will leverage space-based command and control systems, precision weaponry, and dominant maneuver against regional powers capable of challenging the United States' military, economic and political supremacy. The second view warns of a trend in modern conflicts that leans not toward high-tech conventional war but toward unconventional and irregular wars, involving insurgent groups, drug lords, bandits, and terrorists, and the challenges they will create for the United States military.

Future War <sup>3</sup>	High-Tech Conventional War	New Wars
Political Goals	Maintain regional and international stability	Disintegration of states; new forms of power based on ethnic homogeneity
Ideologies	Globalization	Identity politics; nationalist, tribalist, communalist
Forms of Mobilization	Economic, political, humanitarian	Fear, corruption, religion, magic, key role of electronic media
Mode of Warfare	Decisive force, dominant maneuver; swift and overwhelming application of force and rapid withdrawal	Dispersed, fragmented; involvement of paramilitary groups and criminal groups; use of atrocities, famine, rape, sieges; use of light weapons
Geography of War	Regional theaters	Expanding Third World and on seams of retreating bipolar world

**Figure 1: The Evolution of 21<sup>st</sup> Century War<sup>4</sup>**

### High-Tech Conventional War

*JV2010* represents the United States military's plan for fighting the nation's conflicts in the first quarter of the 21<sup>st</sup> century through full-spectrum, battlespace dominance. By applying the tenets of *JV2010*, dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full spectrum protection, and focused logistics, the United States military is projected to be able to fight and win against any adversary at any level of conflict.

Supporting tomorrow's military will be a high-tech, space-based *system of systems*. This *system of systems* will allow United States forces to dominate the battlespace through the merger of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), advanced command, control, communications, computer applications and intelligence processing (C4I), and the application of

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<sup>3</sup> A general definition of “war” is an armed conflict including one or more governments, and causes deaths of 1,000 or more people a year. Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military Expenditures 1987-88 12<sup>th</sup> ed.* (New York: World Priorities, 1987), 28.

<sup>4</sup> The format for Table 1 was taken from Mary Kaldor's and Basker Vashee's Table 1.2, “The changing nature of war,” in *New Wars*. Vol 1 of *Restructuring The Global Military Sector* (London: Cassell, 1997), 10.

force with speed, accuracy, and precision.<sup>5</sup> *JV2010* focuses on military conflict against other conventional armed forces equipped with “like” technology or insurgent and criminal forces armed with high-tech asymmetric counters to conventional United States capabilities.

## New Wars

The second view of 21<sup>st</sup> century war is based on the belief that conflict in the next century will not remain in the realm of what is understood as “Clausewitzian war.” New wars in the coming century will rise from the disintegration or erosion of state structures.<sup>6</sup> The routinization of violence, omnipresence of crime, Third World “youth bulge,” and the continuing social and economic separation between the “haves” and the “have-nots,” spurred by urbanization and the information revolution, will continue to set the stage for armed conflicts in the coming decades.

Prominent authors such as Martin Van Creveld, Robert Kaplan, and Ralph Peters claim our current military is unprepared for a future dominated by an ever-increasing state of global anarchy where the distinction between combat and police actions, and soldiers and criminals will be impossible to determine. Violent internal wars currently raging in countries like Sierra Leone, Colombia, and the Congo appear to reinforce this view of the future. These authors warn of the dangers of becoming enamored and entrapped by the promises of advanced high-tech weaponry while ignoring the realities of the evolving nature of war in the coming decades.

## ***OMFTS and Future War***

Echoing *JV2010*, expeditionary MAGTFs, operating within the principles of the *OMFTS* concept, will leverage technological advances in speed, mobility, fire support, communications, and navigation to seamlessly and rapidly identify and exploit enemy weakness across the

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<sup>5</sup>Admiral William A. Owens, USN, “The Emerging U.S. System of Systems”, Introduction to *Dominant Battlespace Knowledge*, a report from the Institute for National Strategic Studies (Washington DC: National Defense University, downloaded 6 December 1999), 1-7. <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/dbk/dbkch01.html>

<sup>6</sup>Kaldor, and Basker, 8.

spectrum of conflict.<sup>7</sup> Both the *OMFTS* concept and *JV2010* build on the American belief that technological superiority will guarantee victory on the battlefield. Through the application of overwhelming firepower delivered by precision strikes or possibly through computer network attack, the United States will be able to dominate the future battlefield while reducing the chance of American casualties.

The high-tech conventional approach to future war focuses on the upper end of the spectrum of armed conflict against “like” opponents. While the threat of a Major Regional Contingency (MRC) will continue to be present in the coming decades, America’s high-tech conventional military forces may face a future dominated by small wars. Such conflicts may be marked by bad weather, inhospitable terrain, and many small engagements in towns and urban areas, where information warfare, sensors, and smart munitions cannot be employed to their full advantage.<sup>8</sup> The incidence of small wars, waged at the lower end of the spectrum, has increased throughout the 20th century to emerge as the prevalent form of warfare currently facing America’s armed forces. (See Figure 2)

In designing future expeditionary concepts, the Marine Corps should consider the valid points of both views of future war. The Marine Corps cannot prepare for only one or the other, but must remain capable of responding across the entire spectrum of armed conflict. While many claim the end of the Cold War has led to a “new world disorder” and the rise of “new wars,” regional powers such as China, Russia, North Korea, India, and Iran maintain large conventional armed forces capable of challenging American military supremacy in a MRC. The Marine Corps must remain prepared to project expeditionary power ashore in a high-tech conventional war, as


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<sup>7</sup> *Operational Maneuver from the Sea*, I-22.

<sup>8</sup> Institute for National Strategic Studies, *Strategic Assessment 1999: Priorities for a Turbulent World*, (Washington, DC: National Defense University, June 1999), 265.

part of a joint or coalition force, as well as smaller-scale unconventional contingencies fought in deteriorating Third World nations.

The challenge for the Marine Corps will be to create an expeditionary MAGTF capable of winning decisively in both large-scale conventional conflicts and 21<sup>st</sup> century small wars. In pursuing expeditionary concepts such as *OMFTS*, the Marine Corps must take into consideration the unique challenges and demands of fighting small wars in the coming century.



**Figure 2: The Incidence of Small Wars<sup>9</sup>**

The graph represents a comparison between conventional wars and small wars over the last thirty years. Numbers on the Y-Axis represent percentages. \* The figures for 2000(+) (>4% for conventional and <96% for small wars) are based on a minimal estimate of the trend established over the previous thirty years

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<sup>9</sup> Data for Figure 2 was derived from Charles W. Maynes, "Relearning Intervention," *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1995), 108, and Rod Paschall, *LIC 2010: Special Operations & Unconventional Warfare in the Next Century*, Volume 5 of Brassey's Future Warfare Series (New York: Macmillan, 1990), 17.

## **Chapter II**

### **Small Wars**

*As long as men have resorted to war to settle their grievances, irregular forces within the main armies have practiced guerrilla tactics. Among the first recorded examples are the Scythian “hit and run” tactics against the Persians and the Romans, and Hannibal’s counter to their operations – the use of light infantry units – remains one of the best tactics today.*

-Leroy Thompson, *Ragged War*

Small wars are not a 21<sup>st</sup> century phenomenon. They have posed significant challenges to conventional military forces throughout the history of modern warfare under many different titles and forms such as partisan wars, people's wars, colonial wars, Indian wars, uncomfortable wars, low intensity conflicts, and small-scale contingencies. Small wars and their primary participants, insurgent forces employing guerrilla warfare strategy and tactics, have proven to be extremely adept in maintaining pace with the evolution of modern warfare through the centuries.

Small wars will continue to evolve in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Tribalism, extreme nationalism, religious fundamentalism, and hold-over Marxist ideology all provide fodder for small-scale wars, wars likely to be fought within existing states rather than between them.<sup>10</sup> In order to better define today's small war, the evolution of small wars in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century must be reviewed.

#### **The Evolution of Small Wars in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century**

Assigning a single definition for all small wars is difficult, given their unique geographic and political characteristics, and many varying titles have been placed on small wars throughout the history of modern warfare. In his 1896 edition of *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*, Major General Sir Charles Edward Callwell offers a definition of small wars that captures the

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<sup>10</sup> Edwin G. Corr and Stephen Sloan, *Low Intensity Conflicts: Old Threats in a new World* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992), xi.

essence of the British military's 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century small war experience and remains valid today:

Practically it may be said to include all campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides consist of regular troops. It comprises the expeditions against savages and semi-civilized races by disciplined soldiers, it comprises campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellion and guerrilla warfare in all parts of the world where organized armies are struggling against opponents who will not meet them in the open field.<sup>11</sup>

British troops fighting “colonial” or “imperial” wars in remote theaters such as India, Afghanistan, and South Africa in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century faced a wide range of irregular and unconventional opponents. From disciplined and organized Zulus, to the well-educated and highly mobile Boers, to the armed fanatical cut-throats in the hills of the North West Frontier of India, the British found their small war opponents capable of countering the firepower, mobility and conventional battlefield tactics of the period through innovation, boldness and cunning.

During the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, the United States Marine Corps fought a number of expeditionary small wars in Nicaragua, Santo Domingo, Haiti, and the Philippines that mirrored the British imperial and colonial warfare experience. In response to the unconventional demands of expeditionary small wars, the Marine Corps published a *Small Wars Manual* in 1940 describing the tactics, techniques, and procedures for fighting guerrillas, bandits and criminals in remote theaters.<sup>12</sup>

By the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century, two World Wars and the withdrawal of colonial powers from the Third World appeared to remove the international community's requirement for, and interest in, intervention in foreign small wars. Western armies viewed small wars as missions to be avoided

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<sup>11</sup> Sir Charles Edward Callwell, Colonel, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (Lincoln, NB: Bison Books, 1996), 21.

<sup>12</sup> Field Manual (NAVMAC) 2890, *Small Wars Manual*, reprint of 1940 ed. (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, April 1987), 1.

and most were unwilling to alter force structure designed for conventional conflict in Europe to face the challenges of unconventional warfare in distant lands.<sup>13</sup>

During the Cold War, small wars, regardless of their physical characteristics or geopolitical parameters, were viewed primarily in the context of superpower-sponsored insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns. The term low intensity conflict was created to identify the many Third World small wars in which the United States sponsored either pro-democratic governments involved in counterinsurgency campaigns or anti-communist insurgent forces seeking to overthrow communist regimes.

For the United States and other Western nations, low intensity conflicts during the Cold War were primarily fought against disciplined, organized insurgent forces structured along the lines of the Maoist “people’s war” model. Success for both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent centered on establishing legitimacy and gaining the support of the population involved. The demise of the Soviet Union signaled the end of the superpower’s struggle for control of the Third World and removed the political identifiers attached to small wars since the end of World War II.

## **21<sup>st</sup> Century Small Wars**

Today’s small wars resemble the irregular and unconventional conflicts fought on the edges of colonial empires at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, as described by Callwell and the Marine Corps’ *Small Wars Manual*, vice the politically-based bipolar conflicts of the past forty years. Cold War insurgents and guerrillas, who in the past sought a revolutionary transformation of political and economic systems, have been replaced by warlords, criminals, bandits, terrorists, and drug cartels that may seek political, social and economic transformation that is revolutionary in its

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<sup>13</sup> Douglas Porch, introduction in the 3<sup>rd</sup> ed of Sir Charles Edward Callwell’s, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice* (Lincoln, NB: Bison Books, 1996), xvii.

extent, but not necessarily revolutionary in the Marxist sense of building a new system.<sup>14</sup>

Some future small wars may resemble past conflicts in that they will be fought over control of a state or geographic territory or region, while others may be fought over issues particular to the 21<sup>st</sup> century such as the spread of infectious disease or access to fresh water. Steven Metz provides a list of possible insurgencies that may help identify a number of potential future small wars:

Reactionary Insurgency: In which a religious-based group attempts to seize power from a secular, modernizing government.

Defensive Insurgency: Where some subgroup within a state, whether ethnic, tribal, racial, or religious, seeks autonomy or outright independence. Given the extent of the primal conflict in the post-Cold War world, such secessionist – separatist insurgencies may be the dominant form during the next decade.

Commercial Insurgency: Powerful criminal organizations with a political veneer and the ability to threaten national security rather than just law and order. Commercial insurgents probably will not attempt to rule a state but will seek instead a compliant regime that allows them to pursue criminal activity unimpeded.

Subversive Insurgency: Will combine a legitimate, above-ground element participating in the political process of a fragile democracy, and an underground element using political or criminal violence to weaken or delegitimize the government.<sup>15</sup>

Small wars will continue to evolve throughout the coming century. Maoists, secessionists, and separatists will continue to fight small wars in pursuit of “classic” insurgent goals such as political reform and land redistribution. However, a number of new small wars will rise out of the power vacuum left by the absence of the straightforward bipolar power struggle. One particularly dangerous class of small war appears to be rapidly emerging in the post-Cold War security environment, the anarchic war.

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<sup>14</sup> Steven Metz, “A Flame Kept Burning: Counterinsurgency Support After the Cold War,” *Parameters*, Autumn 1995, 33.

<sup>15</sup> Metz, 31-33.

## **Chapter III**

### **Anarchic War**

*If Marines have become accustomed to easy victories over irregulars in the past, they must now prepare for the increased effort which will be necessary to insure victory in the future. The future opponent may be as well armed as they are; he will be able to concentrate a numerical superiority against isolated detachments at the time and place he chooses; as in the past he will have a thorough knowledge of the trails, the country, and the inhabitants; and he will have the inherent ability to withstand all the natural obstacles, such a climate and disease, to a greater extent than the white man. All these natural advantages, combining primitive cunning and modern armament, will weigh heavily in the balance against the advantage of the Marine forces in organization, equipment, intelligence, and discipline, if a careless audacity is permitted to warp good judgment.*

-Small Wars Manual

**anarchic** (a när'kik), adj. producing anarchy; favoring anarchy; lawlessness.

- Scott, Foresman *Advanced Dictionary*

There are a growing number of extremely violent small wars fought by bandits, criminals, and mercenaries in the economically and politically destitute failing and failed states of the Third World. The “insurgents” in this type of small war display little interest in political reform, the concerns of the “people,” or human life itself. Instead, they seek to create an anarchic state of primal lawlessness where social structure and the “rule of law” is replaced by a warlord, clan, or tribal hierarchy and the “rule of the gun.”

Anarchic wars emerged from the definition of “new wars” offered in Chapter I, and the evolution of small wars described in Chapter II. Certain geographic, political, social, and economic factors of the post-Cold War era have caused small wars to mutate into a more dangerous and unpredictable anarchic form. While each anarchic war is unique in the sense that it was initiated by a different set of political and geographic circumstances, all appear to share a set of common characteristics.

Geography: Anarchic wars take place in failing or failed states. Failed states are those in which governance has broken down and virtual anarchy, often taking the form of extremely brutal rule by elements utterly lacking in legitimacy, has persisted across time. Examples of failed states include: Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia, Chechnya, Haiti, and Rwanda. Failing states are those countries that have yet to fall into a state of anarchy, but are actively becoming failed states. Examples of failing states include: Colombia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Zaire, and Kenya.<sup>16</sup>

Political Dynamic: The insurgents display no particular interest in gaining control of the political system, while winning the “hearts and minds” of the population is not required or even desired.<sup>17</sup> As Donald Snow states in *Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflicts*:

In a number of contemporary internal wars...the articulation of a coherent political goal is implicit or derivative, if not missing all together. The internal conflicts in central Africa (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Kenya) are clearly of this nature. In the case of the criminal or narcotics-based insurgency, the basic underlying purpose is political impotency, either to create the lawlessness in which criminal acts can thrive or to facilitate the drug traffic.<sup>18</sup>

The objective of the insurgent in an anarchic war is the removal of all governmental authority through armed conflict, intimidation, terror, and atrocities. The creation of a state of lawlessness allows for unimpeded pursuit of criminal activities and an anarchic lifestyle.

External Support: With the end of the Cold War, international interest and external support for the world’s small wars rapidly dissipated. This lack of external support forces warring

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<sup>16</sup> Donald M. Snow, *Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflicts* (London: Lynne Reinner, 1996), 100-101.

<sup>17</sup> The term insurgent is used in this chapter to signify the combination of rebels, bandits, criminals, profiteers, and mercenaries that typically can be found in an anarchic war.

<sup>18</sup> Snow, 106-109.

factions in anarchic wars to turn to exploiting internal natural resources and the sale and trade of drugs and small arms to support military and criminal operations.

Control/Restraint: The combination of the post-Cold War political-ideological vacuum and the international community's reduced involvement leads to a lack of restraint by all warring factions and increased incidents of genocide, imposed mass starvation, ethnic cleansing, and extreme levels of atrocities.

Mode of Warfare: Loosely organized and dispersed groups of paramilitary, criminal, and mercenary organizations, aligned along ethnic, clan, tribal, and opportunistic lines of authority, combine guerrilla warfare tactics and strategy with selected elements of the military technological revolution to create a lethal and potentially sophisticated counter to conventional intervention forces.

### **The Evolution Continues**

As noted by British and U.S. Marine expeditionary forces in the past, opponents in small wars have proven to be very capable in countering the firepower, mobility and conventional battlefield tactics of a foreign intervention force through innovation, skill, will, and endurance. This will remain true in the coming decades as the complexity, destructiveness and incidence of anarchic wars may possibly increase through the introduction of three post-Cold War factors: the emergence of the New Warrior Class, the proliferation of small arms, and the information revolution.

The Emergence of the New Warrior Class: In *Fighting for the Future*, Ralph Peters identifies what he considers as the primary combatant in 21<sup>st</sup> century, the New Warrior Class. While it is doubtful whether Peters' view of future war, which negates the usefulness of conventional

soldiers and their armies, will be entirely valid in the coming century, his identification of a new breed of warrior has merit when applied to the study of anarchic wars.

The New Warrior Class can be viewed as yet another addition to the wide range of combatants, from bandits to highly organized insurgent armies, that have fought the world's small wars throughout history. However, the New Warrior Class potentially adds another dimension to the conduct of anarchic wars. Having no stake in civil order and habituated to violence and killing since birth, the New Warrior Class needs war to survive. Peace is the least desirable state of affairs, and the New Warrior is inclined to fight on in the absence of a direct, credible threat to his life.<sup>19</sup>

The New Warrior Class cannot be bargained with or forced to accept conflict resolution other than on its terms. The New Warrior Class understands and respects only force and violence. The hearts and minds of the New Warrior Class cannot be won, their bodies must be physically destroyed. Ralph Peters places the New Warrior Class in five pools:

First-Pool Warriors: The archetype of the new warrior class is a male who has no stake in peace, a loser with little education, no legal earning power, no abiding attractiveness to women, and no future.

Second –Pool Warriors: Young males who might otherwise have led productive lives. For these boys and young men, deprived of education and orientation, the company of warriors provides a powerful framework. These are the foot soldiers of the expanding revolution or insurrection, the masses in the streets.

Third-Pool Warriors: The opportunists and entrepreneurs of conflict. When it is profitable or otherwise advantageous, they may speak beautifully of the greater cause – but their real cause is their personal gain in power, money, influence, and security. They are not constrained by faction or even local morality.

Fourth-Pool Warriors: These men are the patriots who fight out of strong beliefs in ethnic, religious, or national superiority, or those who have suffered personal loss in the course of a conflict that motivates them to take up arms.

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<sup>19</sup> Ralph Peters, *Fighting For the Future* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999), 41.

Fifth-Pool Warriors: Dispossessed, cashiered, or otherwise failed military men form the most immediately dangerous pool of warriors.<sup>20</sup> These men bring other warriors the rudiments of the military art. These warriors are especially dangerous, not only because they heighten the level of bloodshed, but also because they provide a nucleus of internationally available mercenaries or gunmen for future conflicts.<sup>21</sup>

The Proliferation of Small Arms: The sheer abundance of light weapons in international circulation, and the ease with which they are transported to areas of tension, has undoubtedly contributed to the incidence, duration, and intensity of armed conflict in the post-Cold war era.<sup>22</sup> The majority of these weapons come from the individual nations of the former Soviet Union who have resorted to selling surplus stocks of Cold War hardware, primarily light weapons (automatic rifles, machine guns, anti-tank rockets, mortars, small artillery pieces, landmines and hand held/crew-served anti-air weapons), at extremely low prices to increase their flow of currency. It is easy to assume the availability of such large quantities of inexpensive but highly dependable and deadly small arms may not only increase the duration and intensity of anarchic wars in the future but actually spawn others.

While there will be no shortage of basic light weapons in the future, increasingly lethal small arms are also becoming available in the world's arms markets. Forced to survive economically in the post-Cold War era, legitimate international arms manufacturers have responded to the expanding small arms market by producing infantry weapons tailored for anarchic wars. An example of this is Russia's Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise, which unveiled a new generation of warheads for their rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) in 1999. Designed

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<sup>20</sup> There is an estimated 9,000 private security corporations comprising of 115,000 personnel in Russia alone. Kevin O'Brien, "Freelance forces: exploiters of old or new-age peacebrokers?" *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 01 January 1998, 42.

<sup>21</sup> Peters, 34-37.

<sup>22</sup> Michael Klare, *An Avalanche of Guns: Light Weapons Trafficking and Armed Conflict in the Post-Cold War Era*, Chapter 3 of Kaldor and Vashee's *Restructuring the Global Military Sector* (London: Cassell , 1997), 59.

exclusively for “local wars” in populated areas, mountains, and broken terrain, the “family” of rocket-propelled grenades has been redesigned for simplicity of operation that requires no training of grenade launcher operators.<sup>23</sup>

The Information Revolution: In most small wars today, advanced communication and information technology are already being exploited. Almost all nations, even those in the Third World, considered to be “developing nations” or failed states, have cellular or repeater phone networks, internet connectivity and other advanced forms of communications such as Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite links. Secure communication technology will be available to coordinate and control the combat operations, terrorist attacks, and criminal activities of even the most low-tech opponents.<sup>24</sup>

The information and communication revolution will lead to an increased presence of the media in future small wars. The media will be equipped to report on remote small wars through the use of sophisticated airborne collection platforms armed with complex sensor suites. International reporters, not constrained by media pools, will not have to physically accompany forces in the field to obtain by-the-minute reporting and high-resolution images of combat operations for friend and foe alike.

American personnel serving in combat zones will have unprecedented personal communication access through the military’s internet system and commercial communication links. The American people will become intimately involved in military operations through immediate, oral accounts of combat actions. Emotional, disjointed and confused reports of

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<sup>23</sup> Anatoly Obukhov and Vitaly Bazilevich. “Antitank Grenade Weapons of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century,” *Military Parade*, September-October 1999, 58.

<sup>24</sup> The United States has the ability to exploit or jam across the spectrum of civilian and military communications networks. However, due to political sensitivities the United States military may not be allowed to fully exploit this capability if the targeted user gains his communication conductivity through an international network carrier. Major Brian Pagel, Communication Officer, United States Marine Corps, interview by the author, 11 January 1999.

success and loss on the battlefield will be quickly transmitted not only to families and friends, but to the media and the enemy.<sup>25</sup>

In future anarchic wars, Marine Corps expeditionary forces may encounter a lethal combination of primitive warriors employing classic guerrilla strategy and tactics, enhanced conventional firepower, and secure high-tech communication systems. To fully prepare for this threat, a current anarchic war must be analyzed. Sierra Leone's anarchic war embodies all of the characteristics described in this chapter and its evaluation can provide the Marine Corps with valuable lessons for preparing for the future.

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<sup>25</sup> In the February 2000 CNN special report *Cry Freetown*, reporter/producer Samura Sorious stated that the rebel/bandit movement that has terrorized Sierra Leone for over ten years has learned they can influence international attention by the level of atrocities they are willing to commit. Sorious claims he was told by rebel leaders that they know Western news agencies, not wanting to offend their audiences, will often not report on, or display extreme levels of atrocities. The greater the level of atrocity they commit lessens the chance it will be reported to a main-stream audience, which in turn lessens the possibility of international intervention. *Cry Freetown*, Produced by Samura, Sorious. 60 min. Presented by CNN Newstand, 2/17/00. Videocassette.

## Chapter IV

### Anarchic War in Sierra Leone

*Intra-state wars are characterized by multiple agendas, blurred boundaries between civilians and combatants, unclear lines of military authority and often appalling brutality. Hostilities frequently involve fighters variously termed terrorists, bandits or guerrillas, whose loyalty often stems from a leader's charisma or from the promise of profit, rather than ideology. The armed teenagers, criminals and guerrillas that frequently comprise insurgent forces prosper from instability.*

-David Shearer, *Private Armies and Military Intervention*<sup>26</sup>

In describing intra-state or civil wars in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, David Shearer accurately portrayed the physical characteristics of the tragic war in the West African nation of Sierra Leone. Few armed conflicts in the world today provide a more distinct example of an anarchic war than this ten-year conflict fought in the nation's rugged interior and the streets of its capital at the cost of over seventy-five thousand lives since 1991.<sup>27</sup>

Military intervention in this violent conflict represents a “worst case scenario” for military planners and diplomats. After ten years of violent intra-state war, the lines between government officials, military leaders, rebel warlords, and commercial profiteers blur as Sierra Leone slips further into the failed state status. The nation’s rapidly deteriorating infrastructure supports little commerce beyond the transfer of diamonds, guns, and drugs. International peacekeepers, pulled into the conflict after Sierra Leone’s armed forces ceased to exist, struggle to maintain nominal control over limited portions of the nation. Geographically, Sierra Leone, compared roughly in

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<sup>26</sup> Shearer, David, *Private Armies and Military Intervention*, Adelphi Paper 316 from The International Institute for Strategic Studies (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) 32.

<sup>27</sup> Ian, Smillie, Lansana, Gerbie, and Ralph, Hazleton, “The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security,” *Partnership Africa Canada (PACNET)*, 1/12/2000 (Ottawa, Canada, downloaded 3 March 2000). <http://www.web.net/pac/pacnet-1/msg00009.html>

size to South Carolina, offers the challenges of operating in the heat, humidity, and rain of equatorial rainforests, mangrove swamps, mountains, and sprawling urban slums.

While the anarchic war in Sierra Leone does not currently threaten America's economic or security interests, the Marine Corps may return to the West African littorals in support of United Nations peacekeeping or humanitarian operations. The Marine Corps deployed expeditionary units to the West African littoral region on two occasions during the 1990s to conduct non-combatant evacuation operations in Liberia's capital of Monrovia, which lies only 100 kilometers from Sierra Leone's southern border. The Marine Corps, mirroring its involvement in Somalia and Kosovo, would likely be tasked with creating a stable security environment for United Nations-sponsored humanitarian or civil assistance operations and programs. Creating a stable security environment may lead to direct armed conflict with corrupt government officials, warlords, drug and gun traffickers, bandits, and criminals who are responsible for ten years of brutal civil war and thrive in the chaotic breakdown of law and order it has produced. The Marine Corps could be forced to fight decisive ground combat actions in an anarchic war for control of Sierra Leone's littoral battlespace.

By reviewing the ten-year history of Sierra Leone's anarchic war, particularly the role played by the South African security firm Executive Outcomes, the Marine Corps can learn valuable lessons in preparing for expeditionary force projection and ground combat actions in future anarchic wars in the littorals.

## Case Study: Sierra Leone

### Country Summary<sup>28</sup>

**Formal Name:** Republic of Sierra Leone

**Geographic coordinates:** 8° 30' N, 11° 30' W

**Administrative divisions:** 3 provinces and 1 area\*; Eastern, Northern, Southern, Western\*

**Capital:** Freetown

**Population:** 2,296,651 (July 1999 est.)

### Physical Geography

**Size:** Land area of 27,925 square miles. Jurisdiction claimed over adjacent territorial sea (Atlantic Ocean) within 200 nautical miles of the Sierra Leonean coast.

**Topography:** Mountainous peninsula; narrow belt of coastal swamplands succeeded by plains that rise gradually to a broad eastern region of low plateaus; plateaus surmounted at places by hill and mountain masses including Loma Mansa, the country's and West Africa's highest point (6,390 feet).

**Climate:** Tropical, high temperatures; single wet season between May and November; mean annual rainfall about 100 inches in most of the country, highest amounts – up to 200 inches- along the coast.

### Military Geography

**Ports and harbors:** Bonthe, Freetown, Pepel

**Airports (paved):** 1 over 3,047 m

1 between 914 m and 3,047 m



**Airports (unpaved):** 5 between 914 m and 3,047 m

3 under 914 m

**Highways:** 1,287 km paved, 10,413 km unpaved

**Communication system:** marginal telephone and telegraph service. National microwave radio relay system made unserviceable by military activities. 1 satellite earth station – 1 Intelsat (Atlantic Ocean)

**Broadcast stations:** 2 television, 1 AM, 1 FM radio



<sup>28</sup> Information and Map 1 and 2 for the Country Summary were taken from the *Area Handbook for Sierra Leone*, by Irving Kaplan and others, Foreign Area Studies, The American University, DA. Pam. No. 550-180 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976), vii., 50, and the Central Intelligence Agency's *World Factbook 1999-Sierra Leone* (Washington DC: downloaded 18 March 2000). <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/sl.html>

## **History of the Conflict**

The origins of the anarchic war in Sierra Leone can be traced to the civil war in Liberia. The National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor and Prince Yormeh Johnson, overthrew Liberian dictator Samuel Doe in 1989. Charles Taylor, who emerged as the dominant leader in Liberia after the coup, expanded his armed conflict into neighboring Sierra Leone. Through the backing of an armed insurgent movement in Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Taylor sought to ensure his access to the rich natural resource areas, specifically the diamond mines, in southeast Sierra Leone.

Roughly 100 RUF guerrillas entered Sierra Leone from NPFL-controlled Liberian territory on 23 March 1991. The RUF's announced political program was to overthrow the All Peoples Congress (APC) one-party regime of Joseph Saidu Momoh and restore a multi-party democracy to Sierra Leone. The RUF's initial military operations in Sierra Leone focused on gaining control of a portion of the diamond mines in the forested region of southeastern Sierra Leone. The RUF used diamonds to purchase large quantities of small arms for its expanding rebel army. Control of Sierra Leone's diamond mines and other vital natural resource centers remained a priority of the RUF throughout the civil war.

The Republic of Sierra Leone's military forces (RSLMF), initially a ceremonial force designed to protect the APC, was rapidly expanded from 3,000 to 14,000. The APC recruited militiamen and mercenaries from the civil war in Liberia and conscripted thousands of local youths. This rag-tag force, under-trained, underpaid, and under-fed, was sent into battle against the rebels in the fertile and diamond-rich South and East of the country.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> David Keen, *The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars*, Adelphi Paper 320 from The International Institute for Strategic Studies (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 27.

In April 1992, a contingent of junior RSLMF officers angered by a lack of pay and frustrated by the level of support to the military, led a coup to overthrow the APC. President Momoh panicked and fled to Guinea when a 28-year old army captain, Valentine Strasser, took control of the government and formed the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). Despite the end of the APC regime, the RUF chose to continue the conflict even though its stated political objectives had been achieved by a handful of disgruntled army officers.

Concerned with increasing their personal wealth prior to the end of the war, many of the RSLMF officers and their troops began to engage in criminal activity. Looting and illegal diamond mining, instead of actively engaging the RUF, became the focus of many RSLMF units in the interior. By the end of 1992, the RUF pushed from Kailahun into the diamond-rich Kono District. Many villages in the interior began arming in order to protect themselves from both the RUF and the RSLMF. Throughout 1993 and 1994, the RUF and the RSLMF continued to be engaged in combat actions centered on the diamond mines in southeast Sierra Leone. It is difficult to determine who had the upper hand in 1993 but, by 1995, it became clear that the RUF had emerged as the dominant force in Sierra Leone.

By 1994, the majority of the public believed most of the violence in Sierra Leone was the work of government soldiers posing as rebels and engaged in criminal activity. The delineation between rebel and government soldier became indistinguishable, as military and rebel leaders designed power and resource-sharing schemes rather than engaging in combat actions against each other.

Desperate to counter RUF gains in early 1995, the NPRC recruited a private security firm from South Africa named Executive Outcomes. The NPRC set four military objectives for

Executive Outcomes: secure Freetown, regain control of crucial resource areas, destroy the RUF's headquarters, and clear remaining areas of RUF occupation.<sup>30</sup>

Using attack helicopters, artillery, and well-paid black Angolan and Namibian troops, Executive Outcomes defeated RUF forces in Freetown and drove them to the Liberian border. Executive Outcomes not only turned the tide of war against the rebels in a few short weeks, but also created a stable political and social environment in which democratic elections were held for the first time in three decades.<sup>31</sup>

However, in January 1996, Strasser and the NRPC were replaced by a freely-elected government led by Tejan-Kabbah. Within six months of Kabbah's taking office, former army bodyguards of NRPC, under the name of the Armed Force Revolutionary Council (AFRC), seized power and offered to share their government with the RUF. At this point, the United States, Great Britain, and the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) persuaded Nigeria to send troops to restore Kabbah. Under the auspices of the ECOWAS, the contingent of Nigerians named ECOMOG slowly gained control of Freetown and Kabbah was restored to power. For supporting his return to power, the governments of America and Great Britain pressured Kabbah to end the contract with Executive Outcomes which however, removed Sierra Leone's only armed force capable of guaranteeing the internal security of the nation.

In 1998, the RUF rallied and reorganized for offensive operations. By 1996, the RSLMF had ceased to exist as a formal military organization. Its officers and men had formed splinter rebel factions designed to exploit the diamond mines or directly joined the RUF. A country-wide RUF assault culminated in Freetown on New Year's Day, 1999. ECOMOG forces eventually forced

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<sup>30</sup> Shearer, 48.

<sup>31</sup> Kevin O'Brien, "Freelance forces: exploiters of old or new-age peacebrokers?" *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 01 January 1998, 42.

the RUF from Freetown but only after it had killed at least 7,335 civilians and left many more thousands mutilated and missing.<sup>32</sup>

Concerned with the increasingly violent state of anarchy in Sierra Leone, but unwilling to commit military force, the United States and Great Britain pressured Kabbah to open talks with the RUF only weeks after the January massacres in Freetown. By July of 1999, peace between the RUF and the Kabbah government had been reached through the Lome Accords. In the peace agreements, the RUF received a United Nations-sanctioned amnesty program that absolved the RUF and its allies of ten years of kidnapping, rape, murder and amputation.

### **The Future of Sierra Leone's Anarchic War**

With Nigeria's withdrawal of ECOMOG in early 2000, due to financial and political reasons, the situation in Sierra Leone continues to deteriorate. By April 2000, the 11,100 personnel of the UN mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), had to be reinforced by an additional 6,000 personnel in an attempt to counter the continuing destabilizing actions of the RUF and AFRC and secure key locations within Sierra Leone.<sup>33</sup>

Peace will be difficult to achieve and maintain in Sierra Leone. The youth conscription tactics of both the RUF and the RSLMF have created a generation of young, combat-experienced fighters that typify a new class of warriors described by Ralph Peters in Chapter III.<sup>34</sup> According to Peters, "these are not 'soldiers,' ...but 'warriors' – erratic primitives of shifting alliance, habituated to violence, with no stake in civil order."<sup>35</sup> This new warrior class requires conflict to survive and will seek to create it when faced with the potential of peace or stabilization.

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<sup>32</sup> Coll, 25.

<sup>33</sup> The rebels have recently seized large quantities of weapons and military equipment from Kenyan and Guinean troops. Segun Adeyemi, "UNAMSIL: A Long Road to Peace," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, April, 2000, 40-41.

<sup>34</sup> One of the most feared elements of the RUF is the "Small Boys Unit," or SBU, which includes boys no older than fourteen and is notorious for carrying out grotesque acts of violence. Steve Coll, "The Other War," *The Washington Post Magazine*, 9 January 2000, 8-27.

<sup>35</sup> Peters, 32.

War will remain prevalent in Sierra Leone as long as there are diamonds in the mines of the country's rugged interior. While publicly pledging to disarm, the rebels have refused to do so. They make more money mining diamonds and smuggling them out through neighboring Liberia than they could through legitimate employment in Sierra Leone where there are virtually no jobs to be had.<sup>36</sup> Sierra Leone has little to offer the international community besides natural resources. Control of these natural resource areas, primarily the diamond mines, equals control of Sierra Leone's future. Each of the many actors in Sierra Leone's complex small war has had a stake in gaining and maintaining control of the diamond mines.

There is no reason to expect an end to the tragic war in Sierra Leone in the near future. Through a brutal ten-year civil war, highlighted by massive atrocities and the continued disintegration of Sierra Leone's social structure, the RUF has secured its place as a determining factor in the nation's future. The RUF has proven "war pays." Empowered by an international community, specifically the United States, that has become increasingly wary of intervention in foreign civil wars, particularly African civil wars, the RUF and other insurgent and criminal groups will continue to seek the achievement of their goals through violence, atrocities, criminal action, and war.

The violent and tragic conflict in Sierra Leone provides a definitive view of an anarchic war. The study of this conflict yields many points of interest for the Marine Corps as it prepares for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. More importantly, a review of Executive Outcomes actions during 1995 and 1996 reveals many potential tactics for defeating the warriors, criminals and bandits of an anarchic war. Regardless of the criticism surrounding the use of mercenary organizations in African civil conflicts, Executive Outcomes achieved decisive results in an anarchic war in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

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<sup>36</sup> Douglas Farah, "Diamonds Are a Rebel's Best Friend," *Washington Post*, 17 April 2000, Sec. A12.

## Chapter V

### **Fighting Anarchic Wars: Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone**

*Executive Outcomes has taken advantage of the instability prevailing in some parts of the world, especially in the so-called “failed states” deserted by the international community. Executive Outcomes showed that it could, with total independence, send its well-equipped and professional troops anywhere and make a real difference*

-Yves Goulet, *Jane's Intelligence Review*


Executive Outcomes performance in Sierra Leone provides an excellent example of how to effectively fight an anarchic war. While it can be argued that Executive Outcomes' success was short-lived and possibly the result of a combination of unique circumstances that may not be duplicated elsewhere in the world, one fact remains indisputable: Executive Outcomes decisively defeated the RUF in Sierra Leone. During its contract with the NRPC, Executive Outcomes removed the RUF from Freetown, stripped it of its access to vital natural resources, and destroyed its sanctuaries in the interior. Executive Outcomes' actions provided the security and stability required to begin the process for democratic elections and the introduction of United Nations peacekeeping forces.

Executive Outcomes is a true mercenary organization; it does not work for ideology or nationalism, but simply for money.<sup>37</sup> While it is not a nation-building force, its actions in Sierra Leone and Angola led to military settlements and assisted in political reconciliation. Executive Outcomes offers to do what United Nations blue helmets can not and will not do: take sides, deploy overwhelming force, and fire pre-emptively on its contractually designated enemy.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Yves Goulet, “Executive Outcomes: Mixing Business with Bullets,” *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 01 September 1997, 426.

<sup>38</sup> Elizabeth Rubin, “An army of their own,” *Harpers*, February 1997, 45.



**Map 3: Executive Outcomes In Sierra Leone, 1995-1996**  
Taken from Shearer, 50.

In a future anarchic war, Marine Corps expeditionary forces may find themselves tasked with military objectives similar to those assigned to Executive Outcomes in 1995: secure the capital, regain control of vital resource areas, destroy the insurgents' headquarters, and clear the country of insurgent occupation. Executive Outcomes' performance in Sierra Leone will be evaluated here through the six warfighting functions to determine how they achieved their assigned objectives in what could be considered a “worst case scenario” for an intervention force: an anarchic small war fought in a failing nation embroiled in an endless intra-state war between a corrupt government and a savage bandit army.

## **Intelligence**

Executive Outcomes achieved strong intelligence capabilities in short order, a success that is especially surprising, given its foreign, white officership and its apartheid history.<sup>39</sup> Executive Outcomes' intelligence gathering and counter-intelligence tactics, based on the extensive Special Forces and counterinsurgency experience of its personnel, created an effective human intelligence (HUMINT) network inside Freetown and territory controlled by the RUF. Executive Outcomes also made extensive use of rural Kamajors tribesman as sources of intelligence, guides, and foot soldiers during combat operations.<sup>40</sup>

Executive Outcomes planes and helicopters equipped with tactical radios, global positioning system (GPS) receivers, infrared/television systems and signals intelligence (SIGINT) equipment proved to be extremely successful in identifying RUF base camps and troop concentrations, as well as intercepting and jamming their communications.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Herbert M. Howe, *Private security forces and African stability: The case of Executive Outcomes* (United Kingdom: Cambridge Press, 1998), 316.

<sup>40</sup> Howe, 316. The Kamajors, who grew to over ten thousand fighters, knew the terrain, enjoyed excellent relations with the paramount chiefs, and resented RUF's intrusions.

<sup>41</sup> Howe, 315.

## **Logistics**

Executive Outcomes operated in Sierra Leone's severely degraded infrastructure without significant host nation support. All supplies were flown in from its support bases in Angola and South Africa. Executive Outcomes maintained a fleet of support aircraft, including two Boeing 727s and a number of smaller fixed and rotary wing aircraft, for logistic sustainment and casualty evacuation within Sierra Leone. Executive Outcomes' procedures stipulated that a physician be available on board one of the Mi-17 troop-carrying gunships during all ground operations in the interior.<sup>42</sup>

Executive Outcomes' personnel employed Russian weapons and combat vehicles, which eased its logistic requirements. The post-Cold War flood of inexpensive small arms from former Warsaw Pact countries into Africa ensured that ammunition, spare parts, and replacement weapon systems were easily to locate and purchase in Sierra Leone and bordering West African nations.

## **Command and Control**

Executive Outcome's primary mission in Sierra Leone was to retrain the RSLMF; however, its personnel often conducted independent pre-emptive actions against the RUF and manned key leadership positions at all levels of the RSLMF during significant offensive operations. Executive Outcomes maintained contact with its dispersed elements in Sierra Leone and its support bases in Angola and South Africa through a dated high frequency (HF) network in which all messages were passed in Afrikaans, as much to confuse the enemy as to keep security at a satisfactory level.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Al Venter, "Market forces: how hired guns succeeded where the United Nations failed," *Jane's International Defense Review*, March 1998, 65.

<sup>43</sup> Venter, 66.

As an independent organization, Executive Outcomes did not have a requirement to coordinate or communicate with a higher command. However, it did have to maintain adjacent command and control ties to the RSLMF and the Nigerian peacekeeping forces that performed rudimentary security functions in and around Freetown.

### Fires

Executive Outcomes operated Mi-17 armed transport helicopters, Mi-24 gunships, a squadron of Swiss Pilatus training aircraft converted to fire air-to-ground rockets, and two jet fighters believed to be MiG-23s.<sup>44</sup> The twenty Mi-24s and Mi-17s flown by sub-contracted Byelorussian crews proved to be extremely effective in providing accurate and destructive close air support fires in support of Executive Outcomes ground operations.

The Mi-24, reconfirming its status established in Afghanistan as an excellent anti-guerrilla fire support platform, inflicted heavy RUF losses. In late 1995, the RUF offered the equivalent of US\$75,000 in diamonds to anyone who managed to destroy one of the Mi-24 employed against them.<sup>45</sup> Many of Executive Outcomes' fixed and rotary wing close air support missions were flown from a support base within Angola. The RUF lacked any credible anti-aircraft weapon systems capable of countering Executive Outcomes' air superiority.<sup>46</sup>

Executive Outcomes employed low-tech Russian small arms and medium crew-served weapons such as the 82mm mortar and the AGS-17 automatic grenade launcher in direct support of ground combat operations. Crew served weapons were either flown or transported via BMP-2 or BTR-60 to fire support positions just prior to a ground assault.

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<sup>44</sup> Goulet, 426.

<sup>45</sup> Venter, 65.

<sup>46</sup> The RUF had few larger caliber anti-aircraft guns but did have RPGs that possibly could have been used in an anti-helicopter role as demonstrated by Somali fighters in Mogadishu in October, 1993.

## **Maneuver**

Executive Outcomes specialized in helicopter-borne strikes and rapid ground assaults against RUF targets. The highly experienced Executive Outcomes operators aggressively sought direct engagements with the RUF on the ground. Multiple guerrilla wars in sub-Saharan Africa provided common training, outlook and combat experience for Executive Outcomes' personnel. The independent nature and special forces backgrounds allowed them to effectively lead RSLMF combat formations in conventional infantry operations or to perform independent reconnaissance and direct action missions with other Executive Outcomes personnel.

All Executive Outcomes ground maneuver was supported by fixed and rotary wing close air support, indirect fire support, and direct fire from BMP-2s when applicable. However, Executive Outcomes ground forces did not become tied to fire support when actively engaged with the RUF. Lacking formal military training and pre-conditioned by years of mediocre RSLMF pursuit, the RUF were stunned and demoralized by Executive Outcomes' forces who were quick to follow up initial contact by helicopter, vehicle or on foot without waiting for the arrangement of extensive fire support packages.

## **Force Protection**

Executive Outcomes maintained no more than three hundred and fifty personnel in Sierra Leone at any given time.<sup>47</sup> Less than two hundred personnel were required for standard combat actions while additional forces were brought in from South Africa and Angola for significant offensive operations. By limiting the number of personnel in Sierra Leone and placing its logistic support structure in Angola and South Africa, Executive Outcomes reduced its requirement for a robust force protection plan.

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<sup>47</sup> Howe, 314.

Executive Outcomes gained valuable internal support and information with generally good behavior towards civilians in Sierra Leone and minimal civic action programs. As one senior Executive Outcomes officer explained, “we train our soldiers to behave with the locals and not to become their enemy...we build trust and acquire more intelligence.”<sup>48</sup>

Executive Outcomes depended on Nigerian peacekeepers and the RSLMF to provide force protection for its limited assets inside Sierra Leone, allowing Executive Outcomes to concentrate its efforts solely on fighting the RUF. The physical security requirements of the NPRC were left to the Nigerians and the RSLMF, who had little to offer the aggressive war being waged by Executive Outcomes but who were more than capable of conducting basic security functions.

Executive Outcomes’ success in Sierra Leone should not be considered as the only way to effectively fight a 21<sup>st</sup> century anarchic war, but as one example of how a relatively small expeditionary force conducted a highly efficient combined arms campaign and achieved its assigned objectives in the chaos of a failing Third World nation. Executive Outcomes proved that a small but highly skilled force may tilt the power balance in domestic wars by acting as a “force multiplier” for existing assets. This is especially true in many Third World conflicts, where the insurgents lack significant military strength and a defining ideology.<sup>49</sup>

This review of Executive Outcomes’ performance in Sierra Leone can possibly provide the Marine Corps with a point of departure for developing tactics for fighting future anarchic wars.

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid, 316.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid, 331.

## **Chapter VI**

### **Intervention Strategy for Anarchic Wars**

The development of intervention strategy for future small wars must reflect the complexity, destructiveness and incidence of anarchic wars as described in Chapter III. This will not be an easy task due to the violent and unpredictable nature of anarchic wars. For the last half-century, the established strategy employed by many Western nations for fighting small wars was based on the political imperative of “legitimacy.” Establishing the legitimacy of a supported anti-communist government or insurgent movement and winning the hearts and minds of the population were seen as the crucial cornerstone in fighting an effective small war in the Third World. This concept, designed to counter a Maoist insurgent movement, would not have worked in Sierra Leone or other anarchic wars fought in failed and failing states by criminals, warlords, and bandits.<sup>50</sup> Small wars continue to evolve; so must our strategy for fighting them.

(See Figure 3)

The best intervention strategy may be to not intervene at all. Recent experiences in Lebanon and Somalia highlight the potentially disastrous consequences of injecting intervention forces between warring factions or groups in failed or failing Third World nations. Anarchic wars, often lacking a true political dynamic, may not be amenable to intervention strategies that propose a negotiated settlement or the introduction of intervention forces as either peacemakers or peacekeepers. As Donald Snow states, “In such cases the only solution may be to allow the

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<sup>50</sup> The legitimacy of Sierra Leone’s government or the legitimacy of the RUF’s insurgent movement was not the cornerstone, or even the focus of Sierra Leone’s ten-year anarchic war. Each side fought to control the wealth to be gained by establishing geographic control of rich natural resource areas while incredible levels of atrocities were inflicted on Sierra Leone’s population by the insurgent force and in some cases by the government itself.

	Traditional Insurgencies	Anarchic Wars
Political Dynamic	Fought for the clear purpose of controlling the political system. Insurgents seek to gain control, and the government seeks to maintain its control.	No particular interest in gaining control of the political system. The objective is to maximize anarchy so there is no authority to interrupt insurgent activities and their anarchic lifestyle.
Support (Popular)	Appealing to the common population as a means to gain or strengthen support is a normal part of the struggle, giving insurgencies their special politico-military mix.	Winning the “hearts and minds” of the population is not a goal or even a concern. Warring factions seek only to control people through terror and atrocities.
Support (External)	Overt/covert military, economic, and political assistance provided by external nations or states seeking to influence the outcome of conflict.	Lacking external interest or support, factions turn to the exploitation of internal natural resources and the sale and trade of drugs and small arms to support military and criminal operations.
Restraint	The imposed consciousness of external supporters and the ultimate goal of gaining and maintaining the support of the people restrain the level of violence.	The combination of a political-ideological vacuum and the reduced involvement of the international community lead to a lack of restraint and increased incidents of genocide, imposed mass starvation, ethnic cleansing, and extreme levels of atrocities.
Mode of Warfare	Organized, dedicated insurgents apply a staged approach to achieve their objectives by employing a combination of political and military strategies. Insurgents depend on guerrilla warfare tactics until they reach a point where they can employ conventional military power to destroy government forces or repel an invader.	Loosely organized and dispersed groups of paramilitary, criminal, and mercenary groups, aligned along ethnic, clan, tribal, religious, and opportunistic lines of authority, combine guerrilla warfare tactics and strategy with selected elements of the military technological revolution to create a lethal and potentially sophisticated counter to conventional intervention forces.
Examples	China (Mao), Vietnam, Cuba, and the initial stages of the Shining Path in Peru and the FARC in Colombia.	Sierra Leone, Angola, Liberia, Rwanda, Haiti, Somalia, Georgia, Sri Lanka, Colombia, and Afghanistan.

**Figure 3: Traditional Insurgencies vs. Anarchic Wars.<sup>51</sup>**

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<sup>51</sup> Information and the concept for Figure 3 was taken from: Donald M. Snow, *Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflicts* (London: Lynne Reinner, 1996), 144-146.

contending parties to fight it out until there is no more fight left in them. Somalia may be a perfect example of this dynamic.”<sup>52</sup>

However, allowing all anarchic wars to rage unchecked in the next century may not be a viable solution. As stated in the introduction, the United States must remain internationally engaged in order to prosper, and its expeditionary forces will possibly be forced into an anarchic war while projecting power ashore in support of America’s international economic, security, and humanitarian interests. Intervention in a future anarchic war may be unavoidable and the Marine Corps must prepare for the development of intervention strategies designed specifically for these conflicts.

If ending an anarchic war is possible, it can only be achieved by a combination of economic, political and military strategies. However, it will be virtually impossible to employ any sort of effective economic or political strategies in the violent and unstable environment of an anarchic war. Stability and security will have to be achieved and maintained by military force alone. In Sierra Leone, Executive Outcomes’ decisive defeat of the RUF created a secure and stable environment for the introduction of a democratic process and international peacekeeping forces.

### **Executive Outcomes’ Intervention Strategy**

Desperate to counter the gains of the RUF and regain control of the nation’s natural resource areas, the NPRC regime hired Executive Outcomes to tactically defeat the RUF. The NPRC was forced to employ a unilateral military approach to Sierra Leone’s anarchic war as a means to create a secure environment for the return of peace and stability.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> Snow, 67.

<sup>53</sup> By the time Executive Outcomes entered the conflict, the NPRC had already lost the tactical fight to the RUF and was quickly losing control of its military forces and the country in general. It is doubtful if the NPRC, run by junior army officers brought to power through a coup, could have successfully waged a complex counterinsurgency campaign involving multiple strategies and elements of national power.

Determining an appropriate intervention strategy for fighting anarchic wars will not be an easy task. Douglas Porch, in the introduction to Callwell's *Small Wars*, identifies a simple but effective strategy developed for unconventional and irregular colonial wars fought against insurgents, guerrillas and bandits of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century that can possibly be applied to anarchic wars.<sup>54</sup> By accurately determining "what the enemy prizes most," the intervention force is able to set clear objectives and craft a viable strategy based on the combat capabilities of their force and the geo-political characteristics of the conflict. Executive Outcomes employed a version of this intervention strategy in Sierra Leone to defeat the RUF and regain control of the nation's vital national resource areas for the struggling NPRC regime.

With only a rhetorical veneer of political ideology, the RUF concentrated its efforts on ensuring its access to the diamond fields without attempting to take part in the political reform of Sierra Leone. For the RUF, ensured access to Sierra Leone's mineral-rich interior represented what they prized most and resembled what is identified today as their center of gravity. The RUF, lacking external support, was physically tied to the mineral resource areas for survival. This proved to be their critical vulnerability as Executive Outcomes was able to focus their intelligence collection efforts on areas they knew the RUF had to defend.<sup>55</sup>

By recapturing and securing the Kono diamond-mining area in August 1995 and the Sierra Rutile mine in December 1995, Executive Outcomes decisively engaged the RUF's center of gravity and took away what they prized most. The loss of access to Sierra Leone's mineral resource areas removed the RUF's ability to finance its criminal activities and support its guerilla

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<sup>54</sup> Porch/Callwell, xvii

<sup>55</sup> It is interesting to note that in many small wars, where the insurgent movement gains support from the local population or external sources, the guerrilla force is able to counter the strength of conventional intervention forces by operating freely without having to defend specific geographic locations.

army in the field. Tactically defeated and suffering from a rapid desertion rate in early 1996, the RUF was forced to enter internationally sponsored peace negotiations.

The NRPC, and the following Bio and Kabbah regimes, did not capitalize on the secure environment provided by Executive Outcomes and it is questionable if any of these transitional governments actually planned on improving Sierra Leone's future at all. While ensured access to the nation's mineral resources, provided by Executive Outcomes, guaranteed wealth to those in power, it appeared to have done nothing for the economic prosperity or political development of the country. The price for relying solely on a military solution to Sierra Leone's anarchic war became evident in late 1996 when Executive Outcomes' contract was cancelled due to international pressure and the RUF re-emerged and began a violent campaign to re-capture Sierra Leone's mineral resource areas.

If the international community, outside of ECOWAS, had shown more than rhetorical interest in potentially ending Sierra Leone's small war, an economic strategy could have been employed to capitalize on Executive Outcomes' military success. International bodies such as the United Nations and the World Bank could have placed pressure on the world's diamond industry not to purchase large quantities of diamonds from West African countries with a negligible diamond production base, specifically Liberia and Ivory Coast.<sup>56</sup>

If properly applied and supported by the international community, economic pressure could have possibly accomplished two objectives. First, the RUF would have found it difficult to support guerrilla and criminal activities if its cross-border sales of illegally mined diamonds no longer brought a profit. Second, the diamond industry, facing a shortage of raw diamonds, would have had to turn to Sierra Leone for the purchase of large quantities of diamonds. If

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<sup>56</sup> Smillie, Gerbie, and Hazleton, 10.

internal security could be maintained, the diamond industry and other foreign investment might have returned to Sierra Leone and possibly fostered both economic and political reform and growth.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> It is important to note that none of this would have been possible if government corruption could not have been reduced to a level where diamond interests and foreign investors were willing to risk investment in Sierra Leone.

## **Recommendations and Conclusion**

*There is a sad lack of authoritative texts on the methods employed in small wars. However, there is probably no military organization of the size of the United States Marine Corps in the world which has as much practical experience in this kind of combat.*

-Small Wars Manual

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the Marine Corps must be prepared to respond to a wide range of crises and conflicts in the littorals. While the threat of a Major Regional Contingency (MRC) and humanitarian emergencies will continue to be present in the coming decades, Marine Corps expeditionary forces face a future dominated by unconventional and irregular small wars fought by bandits, criminals, and mercenaries in the economically and politically destitute failing and failed states of the Third World.

From storming the coastal forts of the Barbary pirates to eliminating weapons caches of Somalia warlords, the Marine Corps has fought small wars throughout its history. As noted by the above quote and by F.G. Hoffman in *Decisive Force*:

The Marine Corps has a historical reputation for service in expeditionary environments and crisis...In fact, of all the Services, the Marine Corps is the one most culturally predisposed toward small-scale conflicts requiring extensive and delicate politico-military interaction.<sup>58</sup>

While the Marine Corps has found success in fighting past small wars, it must now concentrate on the small wars of the future. Future small wars, fought with lethal conventional weapons, will be waged over complex geographic, economic, ethnic, religious, and political issues. The purpose of this paper is to define and evaluate the characteristics of those small wars, specifically anarchic wars, to aid in the development of strategy and tactics for fighting them in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The following recommendations are provided in pursuit of that effort.

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<sup>58</sup> F. G. Hofman, *Decisive Force: The New American Way of War* (London: Prager, 1996), 116.

## **Achieving a Balance**

The identification of small wars as the prevalent form of warfare in the current strategic security environment in many ways contradicts the view of future war sponsored by *JV2010* and *OMFTS*. The Marine Corps must find the middle ground between the two views of future war offered in Chapter 1. Advanced technology can be a force multiplier in an anarchic war, as demonstrated by Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone, but it cannot be exclusively relied on and must be regarded as only one element of an effective anarchic war intervention force.

Expeditionary small wars have dominated the Marine Corps' past and will likely do so in the future. In preparing for the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the Marine Corps can not focus solely on the large-scale conventional wars it wants to fight while ignoring the small wars, specifically anarchic wars, it may have to fight.

## **Intervention Strategy**

Today's small wars resemble the irregular wars and unconventional conflicts described in the Marine Corps' *Small Wars Manual*, vice the politically-based bipolar small wars of the past fifty years. The Marine Corps must develop an effective intervention strategy that reflects the post-Cold War strategic environment. The Marine Corps cannot rely on Cold War counterinsurgency strategy, designed primarily for revolutionary warfare, as its primary means to counter the potential threats of tomorrow's small wars. While this type of strategy may apply to a limited number of "classic" small wars in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, it will prove to be useless in anarchic wars like Sierra Leone's.

Nothing can be done to improve or reverse the economic or political future of the world's failed and failing states until their anarchic insurgents are either destroyed or effectively controlled. As demonstrated by Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone, a unilateral military

strategy designed to attack the critical vulnerability of an anarchic insurgent movement may be the best option for successful intervention in future anarchic wars. Executive Outcomes' success can be measured by the tactical defeat of the RUF, the securing of the nation's mineral resource areas for the NRPC, and the creation of a stable security environment. However, military victories create only temporary solutions, and a unilateral military strategy must be quickly followed by the introduction true political and economic reform, neither of which the NRPC or the following regimes instituted. In future anarchic wars, the involvement of the international community will be required if the economic and political reform of a failed state or failing state is expected once a military intervention force has created a stable security environment.

## **Intelligence**

In Sierra Leone, Executive Outcomes' tailored expeditionary force, consisting of highly experienced counterinsurgency personnel, conducted a remarkably efficient combined arms campaign and achieved its assigned objectives amidst the chaos of a failing Third World nation. However, Executive Outcomes' intervention strategy in Sierra Leone would not have been successful if it had not employed a comprehensive HUMINT and SIGINT intelligence collection plan. The Marine Corps should seek to gain the intelligence collection capabilities Executive Outcomes exploited in Sierra Leone.

Executive Outcomes relied on rural Kamajors tribesman as HUMINT sources, guides, and combat troops. While the Marine Corps does not currently prepare units to train, support, and possibly lead indigenous forces, it has done so in past expeditionary small wars.<sup>59</sup> Even though training indigenous populations is currently the responsibility of the U.S. Special Operation Command (SOCOM), the Marine Corps may look toward obtaining elements of this capability.

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<sup>59</sup> In Nicaragua, U.S. Marines trained local counter-insurgency forces which tracked and killed the guerrilla leader Sandino. Thompson, 13.

This could be completed by achieving closer working relationships with the U.S. Army's regional Special Forces commands or by creating an organic capability within expeditionary MAGTFs.<sup>60</sup>

In Sierra Leone, Executive Outcomes employed airborne intelligence collection platforms to identify rebel concentrations, employ supporting arms, and direct the rapid and decisive maneuver of air and ground forces. To achieve a similar capability, a designated number of Marine Corps MV-22 or CH-53E aircraft, which offer exceptional range, speed and loiter time, could be equipped with tactical radios, GPS receivers, infrared/television systems, SIGINT equipment, laser range finder/designators, and possibly a side-firing gun such as the GAU-19. These aircraft would not only act as an intelligence collection platforms but could also assume the role of pathfinders, forward air controllers, command and control aircraft, and possibly air-to-ground fire support systems.<sup>61</sup>

### **Small Wars Manual**

The last time the Marine Corps formally addressed the topic of small wars was in 1990 when it reprinted, without updating, the 1940 edition of the *Small Wars Manual*. This was an attempt to prepare the Marine Corps for the many small wars that appeared to be spreading as the Soviet Union began to collapse. While many aspects of the *Small Wars Manual* remain relevant today, it must be revised to reflect the demands and challenges of small wars in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, specifically those provided by anarchic wars. The Marine Corps' recent experiences in Haiti and

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<sup>60</sup> This could be achieved by sending select Marines to the U.S. Army's Special Forces Qualification course in Ft. Bragg, NC.

<sup>61</sup> Suggestions for the creation of this type of airborne collection/fire support platform for the Marine Corps were taken from a personal interview, via E-Mail, of Mr. Roger Bowers, a senior member of *AirScan*. *AirScan* is a private company that has extensive experience in flying day/night airborne surveillance and security missions in Angola, Malaysia, Colombia, and the United States. *AirScan*'s success, documented in the January 1998 edition of *Jane's Intelligence Review*, is the result of the successful fusion of sophisticated intelligence collection sensors and experienced close air support pilots. Mr. Roger Bowers, *AirScan*, interview by the author, 26 April 1999.

Somalia, as well as case study's of current anarchic wars in Sierra Leone, the Congo, Sri Lanka, and Liberia, can provide the foundation for developing an updated *Small Wars Manual*.

## **Conclusion**

While anarchic wars do not currently threaten America's economic or security interests, the Marine Corps must prepare now for this challenge. In a future anarchic war, the Marine Corps, as was the case with Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone, will likely be tasked with creating a stable security environment for the introduction of follow-on U.S. military forces or internationally-sponsored relief and reform agencies. Creating this stable security environment may lead to direct armed conflict with corrupt government officials, warlords, drug and gun traffickers, bandits, and criminals who thrive in the chaotic breakdown of law and order of anarchic war.

As the nation's premier forward-deployed expeditionary force, the challenge for the Marine Corps in the coming years will be to create an expeditionary MAGTF capable of projecting decisive power ashore in both large-scale conventional conflicts and anarchic wars. In pursuing expeditionary concepts such as *OMFTS*, the Marine Corps must take into consideration the increasingly unique challenges and demands of fighting anarchic wars.

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